“The discourse promoting resistance to racism must not prompt identification with and in terms of categories fundamental to the discourse of oppression. Resistance must break not only with practices of oppression, although its first task is to do that. Resistance must oppose also the language of oppression, including the categories in terms of which the oppressor (or racist) represents the form in which resistance is expressed.” (Goldberg 1990: 313–14)
I haven’t written this as a formal paper so I apologise that it is a bit scattered, colloquial, or undercooked in places. I’ve had a vague sense of what I have wanted to talk about for a while, particularly as I have been developing and running an undergraduate programme, BA World Philosophies (WP) at SOAS University of London, thinking about its future, its gaps, and indeed the purpose and potential of the classroom. In this paper the various threads that have floated through my thinking life are here assembled in the hopes that they will take shape as we all speak with each other. Here I will start briefly with the affective dimensions that lie behind the move into WP that we have tried to pursue at SOAS and why I still think we aren’t getting it right and then move to discuss polemic as a means forward.
I’ve been thinking about the intransigence of philosophy against, but also within the background of its institutional presence, the ways in which quality is assessed, the marketisation of HE which demands that a degree is useful, leads to good employment outcomes etc. Questions of quality and marketability are obviously forms of capitalist governmentality, racialised, gendered, and classed. Why does the discipline remain so white? So parochial? So utterly irrelevant and bourgeois? So unattuned to the importance of embodiment for the act of thinking. Thinking cannot forget, must not forget that our flesh, sinews, neurons, bones, hormones—and the history that lays these down in particular patterns, traumas, determinations—is the beginning and the end of thought.
About 8 years ago, as a consequence of reading Arvind-pal Mandair’s Religion and the Specter of the West (2009) where he makes a beautiful and challenging argument for the clear coeval status of different philosophical traditions, and my broader interest in the emerging activism around decolonisation on university campuses, I began to put together an undergraduate programme to address the colonial, racist nature of academic philosophy. It seemed obvious to me that the intellectual grounds for so doing were strong, indeed unassailable, and further that SOAS, an institution preoccupied with its origins in colonial utility, but with a level of cultural and linguistic specialism that would enable a serious engagement with intellectual traditions not engaged with the priorities of European thought, was the right place to begin to dismantle the narrowness of the discipline. It was a matter of intellectual adequacy in a post-colonial world, but beyond that, simply good sense. It was hardly the case that only dead white men had done all the thinking in the world and it had to be admitted, that even when they had, the results were rarely edifying. Rather, philosophy served to shore up, often generate, racist and oppressive social structures. Could this be overcome? I thought, perhaps naively, that it could. There was a possibility for philosophy that invited the novel, the unindebted, the imaginative.
The business case for the programme also seemed sound and it was this latter element that won the day. The BA World Philosophies, offering a range of modules designed to enable students to engage with non-western intellectual traditions, was born. It has proved tremendously successful in terms of recruitment. We are growing at a time that other philosophy departments in the UK are closing. And yet, it seems to me that the very process of programme design was determined more by market demands than a commitment to decolonisation being more than just a metaphor (2012), more than simply a lucrative selling point. For example, in order to be recognised by consumers as a “legitimate” philosophy degree, we had to ensure that students would encounter training in the major subfields of European philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, philosophy of language and mind and so on. What were we to do if we were trying to teach these areas via the resources of non-western philosophies if and when those very philosophies did not organise knowledge about the world in these terms? To be frank, it felt rather like we were black-facing Philosophy, a kind of pantomime that was not only distortive, it was offensive and misdirected. Philosophy, the discipline, wasn’t really being transformed by these efforts. Rather our approach was supplementary, even if we intended it in Derrida’s expansive and iconoclastic sense (1976: 144-45). The problem I came to see was philosophy’s intransigence alongside the normative whiteness of my own and my colleagues’ training. Philosophy is not an open discipline, one seeking justice or liberty, or transformation. No. It prefers the appearance of decolonisation rather than the cost of what it would mean: radical ground clearing and beginning again. And, with regard to my social position and that of my colleagues, we were all white, we were all ostensibly middle-class, we were all gaining from an association with a decolonising agenda.
My experiences of running the World Philosophies programme and my reflections since as I have sought to articulate a vision of what it must and can mean, was to arrive at a point where I identified three strands that had to inform the practice and teaching of WP. These are: the implementation of decolonial critiques and the reimagining of philosophy as a global discipline; dialogic and critical-comparative analyses between global intellectual traditions; specialism in specific non-western philosophical traditions. Of course, there is a significant tension between these three principles, not least with the critical-comparative hermeneutic method where there is a requirement to find some common ground or principles which then must be translated into a global idiom. The question then has to be whose idiom? What is translatable, and more importantly, what is not and why is it not? Moreover, in foregrounding intellectual traditions and philosophical systems that are non-European, there is a risk of privileging elite discourses that have their own oppressive histories. As such we find a contradiction between the decolonial intent to listen to subjugated knowledges, and those traditions which, while subalternised with respect to the western philosophy, are nonetheless themselves hegemonic in their own contexts.
Can philosophy be thought differently? Can philosophy be different? Is there a philosophy that is not philosophy as we know it or come to know it? These questions matter because they bear on what philosophy is, where it is located, what that means for what is thought, and how thinking itself may be a means to transform the world. But I think there is a bigger question that doesn’t get asked enough in philosophy more broadly. Who is the philosopher? We will all know why this is. We know that thinking in the European tradition is necessarily disembodied in order to disguise the specifically embodied nature of the philosopher. It is a sleight of hand but one which has proven intractable, signalled by the separation of epistemology and ontology as separate subfields.
Polemic: Thinking and Doing
In order to address the broader question of this workshop—what is thinking?—I want in this paper, to argue for the utility of polemic as a practice necessary for any global/world/geophilosophy, indeed for thinking in general. I want to rehabilitate polemic from the sense within the discipline of philosophy that it is an improper mode of address, not something associated with good-faith arguments. Polemic is seen as a critical indulgence, unbalanced and impetuous, and in this way it becomes defanged and dehistoricised. It’s fairly obvious why there is this association if we make that generally tiresome move that seeks meaning from origin, i.e., etymology. From the Greek polemikos meaning ‘warlike; belligerent; skilled in war’ as well as ‘the act of stirring up hostility,’ polemic is a mode of critique intent on provocation and attack. Its bent is violent, uncompromising, antagonistic. The irony should not be lost on us here that violence is and has been the modus operandi of the western world, of western philosophy, materially and epistemologically. You see, what is offensive, what is improper, what is untruthful is the exclusion by philosophy of the lifeworlds, the intellectual traditions and resources of the global south, of Black people, of trans people, of subalterns, indigenous thinkers. That western philosophy doesn’t even preface itself, that it refuses to learn the languages and thoughts of the other as somehow too specific, too parochial, perhaps even too naïve, is offensive. It is in need of indictment as a weak-minded, intellectual backwater that has nothing to bring to the fight for justice, for liberty, equality, community. It is utterly trivial in its preoccupations, its methods, profoundly conservative in its curricula, It is far too white, it is pale, male, stale, and frail. The complacency of the discipline is the enemy. To move to geo-, global or world philosophy, we must recognise that we have a fight on our hands, however. It is worth going to war over. It is worth being belligerent about it. To stir up hostility is, I believe, faithful to Fanon’s call to refuse the Manichean struggle that colonialism sets up. To deliberately stir up hostility, is I believe, a legitimate philosophical objective: the politeness of philosophy masks its antagonism to everything that is not white, bourgeois, male, heteronormative, able-bodied. Polemic is useful because it can bring the antagonism out into the open. Expose it. Give flesh to it. To call on embodiment as the site of thinking. It calls to account without seeking a dialectic resolution.
I can see why philosophers in the cloistered setting of a senior common room, clutching a dry sherry, might exchange meaningful glances if I were to kick off loudly with a diatribe against the racism and sexism of philosophy as but the mere tippiest tip of the iceberg. Polemic is impolite. It interrupts. It is not a respecter of status. It’s not bourgeois. It doesn’t care about decorum. And, I put it to you, this is because the polemicist cares. That is the main thing that makes polemic useful: it is bold faced about its investment in an argument and its outcome. Polemic summons the interested character of knowledge. In a time of the hyper-marketization of HE, of an antidebate culture under the guise of freedom of speech claims or cancel culture, book banning, racist murder whether by the state or individuals, bans on a woman’s right to reproductive freedom, climate crisis, fascist populism and totalitarianism, transphobia, religious hate crimes etc., it is worth, I think, remembering that to be a scholar and a philosopher might mean not losing the sense of having something vital to fight over. Thinking matters, who thinks, why we think, where we think from, who we think for, with and against, and what we think is worth thinking about, matters.
Polemic is not only a rhetorical move as its detractors would doubtlessly claim. It is a practice of thinking moving into speech and action to confront system and structure. What may seem mere contrariness, and for that reason offensive, appears from this perspective rather as the foregrounding of one’s own interested knowledge. It is the meeting of the other view on an open terrain, honestly. The standpoint of polemic rejects the discourse of negotiation—that somehow my position here, and your position there can arrive at some agreement where we let go of our attachment to the embodied experiences that ground our political interests and intellectual commitments—because there are some things that cannot brook compromise. Philosophy trades on the rhetoric of the positionless position but when your position is one that has and still does breed a parochialism disguised as cosmopolitan universalism, the domain of the intellectual sophisticate, then that is not and never will be a credible position. I find it astonishing that the parochialism of European philosophy does in fact pass as credible, evidenced by the tedious CFPs, syllabi, publications, and online forums that claim to be philosophy writ large. One can only answer such a stance with a kind of epistemic violence and impudence. We may, obviously at great risk, completely refuse the terms in which the discourse is supposed to proceed. There is no negotiation to be had with a position so lacking in good faith.
How do we think without a past, or, at least, beyond a past? Here Hélène Cixous’s hope resounds poignantly: “There has to be somewhere else, I tell myself….Everyone knows that a place exists which is not economically or politically indebted to all the vileness and compromise. That is not obliged to reproduce the system….I am searching: somewhere there must be people who are like me in their rebellion and in their hope” (1996: 72). Frantz Fanon offers a similar call: “Let’s go, comrades, the European game is definitely finished, it is necessary to find something else” (Fanon 1963: 239). Does the question of thinking in geophilosophy point to this something else, a form of praxis that does not reproduce the system but invites and incites novelty? It is not so much that we must ignore the past, for that is what gives us the impetus to think differently. Rather, isn’t one of the decolonial moves the recognition of the irredeemability of the colonial and racist past such that its discursive contents cannot be repurposed in the search for justice and liberty?
Polemic cannot, therefore, be content merely with the work of critique. No, the value of polemic is that seeks to affect change and birth newness in the service of justice and liberation. It indicts unjust structures and intellectual histories and productions in order to overthrow the tyranny of the past, to open the world to novelty. It is active. It must therefore begin with the work of ground clearing. It breaks with the poignancy of the postcolonial intellectual entangled in hybridity and mimicry, destined to repeat the past, reify the power of the oppressor because the latter sets the terms and tone. Postcolonial critique is only made possible by what is already there, the historical facticity—the content and form—of European colonialism and the imposition of what Naoki Sakai has termed its ‘homolingual’ idiom (1997). Thus for Spivak, postcoloniality involves the persistent critique of ‘a structure that one cannot not (wish to) inhabit’ and the necessity of saying ‘an impossible “no” to a structure, which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately’ (1993: 60). But must we remain there, in this structure that determines the conditions and terms of our habitation? How may geophilosophy—thinking and doing as a necessary pair—rupture the referentiality of the past and seek new concepts, modes of being, ways of thinking.
Polemical texts have an honourable history of challenging structures and systems which are totalitarian and oppressive in pursuit of the novel. Although the history of this tradition is dominated by angry white men, I want to suggest that the adversarial and iconoclastic practice and intent of polemic has been the most significant and powerful aspect of feminist, critical race, queer, postcolonial, and Marxist theory and politics, amongst others. Philosophy has confined these critical moves to the outskirts of the discipline and the result is an etiolated, ostensibly deracinated but deeply white field (and institutionalised site) that is hampered in its pursuit of justice and emancipation because its priorities, categories, and practices are exclusionary and confining. Philosophy finds itself on the side of the oppressor, and thus a polemical assessment of the discipline is warranted and necessary if philosophy is going to overcome the deeply racist and imperialist assumptions that underwrite its history, its preoccupations, its institutional presence. Underlying my argument here is a concern to find the routes whereby novelty may arise, which is to say how, in the aftermath of the violence of the imperium, how might a new humanism (Fanon) take hold, not indebted in any way with the past we must repudiate?
My interest in polemic was first inspired by the tradition of polemic engaged in by Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, whose subtitle A Polemic (Eine Streitschrift –literally a fight script/song) is rarely remembered. I don’t intend in this paper to dwell on Nietzsche’s overall project in detail; rather, I want to note that his intention in all of his work was the leitmotif of the ‘revaluation of all values,’ something that he works through particularly in the GM and which certainly became a preoccupation of continental philosophy going forward. Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation of all values’ is intended to revive philosophy as an art of living, by emphasising self-education and self-cultivation—Bildung. It is this art that enables access to a unique form of truth about our humanity. To Nietzsche, finding one’s ‘true self’ was a crucial starting point in his concept of Bildung because until we have the courage to confront the truth of our human, all too human existence, and learn to embrace ‘what one is’ now, it will be almost impossible to become ‘true human beings’. Nietzsche’s account of Bildung as a dynamic way of living such as learning to see, think, speak, write and feel in becoming true human beings implies coming to the realisation that our lives and world we inhabit is subjectively determined a posteriori. To Nietzsche, self-education and self-knowledge is important because it provides an insight into why human beings hold dubious and prejudicial points of view and then break out of these. Of course, Nietzsche’s vision of humanity is limited to the degree that it does not recognise the value of the particular, although many thinkers have taken up his work to engage precisely with the particularity of the ‘true self’ and indeed this search becomes an important aspect of decolonial polemic which I will examine shortly.
The project of ‘revaluing values’ strikes me as a useful starting point for thinking through what we may hope for from geophilosophy, not least to recognise the emptiness of the European liberal tradition. Polemic is the method for escaping the referentiality of the past, and to move towards the generation of newness, towards liberation. Philosophy—thinking and doing—is for liberation rather than merely an abstracted preoccupation with the “good life” or the love of wisdom. In my view, the practice of polemic enables this change in tenor due to its uncompromising stance, its refusal to negotiate.
There are several thinkers in the tradition of decolonisation who may guide us better than Nietzsche does in pursuing the ground-clearing potential of polemic: Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Subcomandante Marcos (aka Rafael Sebastián Guillén). It is notable, I think, that each of these thinkers were involved in real-world conflict and struggle and, moreover, as a consequence, they argue strongly that thinking and action goes hand in hand. They each understand that a new humanity is the outcome of the struggle having engaged in a revaluation of values.
Decolonial Polemic: The Art of War
Aimé Césaire coins the term “Négritude” in 1939, in terms that I believe reflect the idea of polemic as practice, of living and being embodied. He uses it first in his long prose-poem Notebook of a Return to the Native Land which is later included in Discourse on Colonialism (1972). Négritude, according to Césaire, is at once “a violent affirmation” of Black personhood as well as “a struggle against alienation;” “an awareness of the [need for] solidarity among blacks;” “a resistance to the politics of assimilation;” “a decolonisation of consciousness;” “a reaction of enraged youth;” “a concrete rather than abstract coming to consciousness;” and, a “search for…identity” (Césaire, 1972: 72-76). Césaire wanted to invent a new language, rooted in a polemical assessment of European colonialism in order to more adequately express a new African logic: a commitment to revolution, decolonisation, and re-Africanisation: “I want to emphasise very strongly that…I have always strived to create a new language, one capable of communicating the African heritage” (Césaire, 1972: 67).
In Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire claims that “European civilisation” has “two major problems to which its existence has given rise: the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem” (1972: 9). Négritude for him therefore had the responsibility of fighting both capitalism and colonialism, or what we might now want to call racial capitalism. It is in the locus of the dialectic of European civilisation and African colonisation that Césaire confronts and contests the “howling savagery” and “barbarity,” as he put it, of “the negation of civilisation” (1972: 15, 18). This is such an important riposte to the now subterranean assumption that western philosophy is somehow at the vanguard of human progress.
Césaire understands European civilisation to be wholly contingent on the colonisation of non-Europeans and he indicts it as a “decadent” and “dying civilisation” that had “undermined civilisations, destroyed countries, ruined nationalities, eliminating ‘the root of diversity’” (1972: 9, 59). To oppose and resist the global destructiveness of European “civilisation,” he insisted that persons of African descent, working together with other colonised, exploited, and alienated human beings, should rebel and revolt against the savage brutality of European thought, culture, and society.
Thus, Césaire suggests “that the emancipation of the N**** consist[s] of more than just political freedom.” Négritude involves a rigorous “search for identity” and freedom which is fundamental to the formation of any human(e) identity (Césaire, 1972: 76). Under colonialism neither the colonised nor the coloniser knows himself or herself. The colonised live lives of “double-consciousness,” as Du Bois put it. Grappling with “the urge for freedom” places the colonised squarely in opposition to the coloniser, leaving both sides in conflict. Césaire (1972: 25) recognises that “it is the colonised man who wants to move forward, and the coloniser who holds things back”. The coloniser seeks to overwhelm and deny the colonised person’s “being-in-the-world,” their very perception and experience of the world in which they inhabit and have inherited, reducing the colonised human being to a mere object or thing in the coloniser’s mind. Césaire neatly sums up such a move as “colonisation = thingification” (1972: 21), an equation that I think rather nicely works to explain the disembodied nature of a great deal of western philosophy.
Discourse on Colonialism expresses forceful sense of the nature of the struggle involved in decolonisation and the centrality of Négritude as a new Black consciousness as necessarily “negative”—dare I say polemical—or critical consciousness. Négritude, being nothing other than “a concrete rather than abstract coming into [African] consciousness,” leads Césaire to claim that “it is equally necessary to decolonise our minds, our inner life, at the same time that we decolonise society” (1972: 76, 78). Here again we have thought and action inextricably connected.
Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1963) is similarly a handbook for revolutionary action advocating decolonisation with more urgency and immediacy than Black Skin, White Masks; it is in this later text that he denounces the physical violence of colonialism and advocates that it must be countered with direct violence against the coloniser. In Black Skin, White Masks, however, although he is highly critical of colonial politics, and he expresses anger towards the coloniser’s sense of superiority and the stark reductions of the stereotypes that continue to circulate around notions of ‘Black identity’, he perceives the violence of colonialism as a cultural situation: part of a system of significations and associations that weave themselves insidiously into the consciousness of both coloniser and colonised. The colonised is the victim above all of the pernicious image of his identity propagated by colonial ideology, rather than simply of brute force. So, in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon examines the politics or modes of thinking necessary for their overthrow.
Both texts, however, denounce the colonial system, albeit from different points of view; while proposing a far broader, quasi-humanist ‘dialectic of experience’ and a belief in self-invention. Fanon is both a political activist and a philosopher of what it means to be human and, even more, this revised, anti-Eurocentric form of humanism touches, at least implicitly, on an ethical commitment to otherness and to the new. Fanon’s work, taken as a whole proposes a significant renewal of the very concept of the human, of ongoing self-creation as opposed to reification and stasis which he associates with European culture and thought. Such a stance is invaluable for the project of geophilosophy.
Fanon’s conclusion to Black Skin, White Masks·goes beyond the concerns of identity politics and celebrates how ‘History’ no longer has the capacity to over-determine the human; rather, the subject rises out of its confines and posits itself beyond its conditioning. As Fanon affirms ‘I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny’ and he resolves ‘in the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself’ (1967: 163). This self-invention does not liquidate difference, as some critics have suggested, but acknowledges difference while refusing to allow it to be confined to a static category. Fanon’s dialectic is also one rooted in lived experience, but he uses that engagement with the concrete and the everyday to create an altered and renewed form of self-consciousness.
If Fanon is most ostensibly a defiant political thinker, he also signals in this conclusion the seeds of an ethical reconfiguration of self and other. If the white man’s tyranny is rooted in his imposition of a reified image onto Black people and in their subsequent splitting and disavowal, then the overthrow of that tyranny demands the liberation of the other (colonised) from the controlling gaze of the self (coloniser). Fanon’s belief in reinvention and mobility proposes an alternative ontology that refuses to allow Being to attain the mastery and statis of Totality. Self and other coexist in the world and, in meeting, perceive one another’s inassimilable difference. Political liberation requires at the same time an alternative perception of Being that stresses its continual processes of recreation, and Fanon’s demand for attention to this notion of Being does implicitly belong to the realm of what humanity ‘ought’ to do. Freedom is not secondary here, but the affirmation of the freedom of the self also requires the recognition of the other’s ability to recreate itself freely. Fanon’s humanism is no longer that of the universalisation of European values, but a more open demand for a liberated form of individual self-creation, as well as a specific symbol of resistance rather than a new transcendentalism. Recognition of the other’s humanity entails an understanding of his or her singular form of self-invention.
The Wretched of the Earth is from the outset a more overtly committed and militant text than Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon opens with a clear call to arms: ‘national liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, Commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent process’ (1967: 27). One of the central tenets of the text is that given the intransigence of colonial force, decolonisation can occur only when that force is met with equal antagonism. The colonised should not wait to try to subvert the system from within. Further, Fanon’s description of the underlying structure of colonial thinking is equally stark. Coloniser and colonised are pitted against one another in the form of a rigid binary opposition, and there is no possible communication or mediation between them. The colonial society of Algiers in particular is ‘in compartments’; it is segregated and divided along racial lines in such a way as to fix and negate the colonised. Algiers is divided between designated areas for coloniser and colonised, and that segregation is accompanied by social inequality. The frontiers between these areas are guarded by police or military officers. The only go-between is the soldier, and the transgression of the border is vigilantly supervised, in turn reinforcing the racial divide. So colonialism in Algeria relies on this stark segregation of one society from another, and the end of that system demands the dramatic and violent rejection of the dominant community by those who have been colonised. Whilst Fanon does not here analogise from the material situation of colonisation to an epistemic one, the segregating tendencies of western philosophy could equally be put in the frame in order to notice how it operates in a vacuum. The border logics of the discipline reinforce a series of divisions that are racialised, classed, and gendered.
Decolonisation, for Fanon, therefore is an absolute process and entails the total destruction of one society and its replacement with an entirely different social structure. It is a fundamental change, and doesn’t involve negotiation or mediation because it necessitates the end of an entire regime, and the substitution of existing rulers for different ones. Colonialism itself is not an ideology that is open to questioning but a total system, whose effects can be fixed only by the destruction of the system itself. Non-violence is for Fanon acquiescence, the acceptance of the colonial vision, and resistance must be expressed by the use of force: ‘colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence’ (1967: 48).
Fanon’s call to violence is nevertheless not simply a means to condone the shedding of revolutionary blood, but also a call for creativity and spontaneity. The new revolution gives rise to the creation of new people, to new forms of consciousness that can sweep away the injustices and prejudices of the old:
This people that has lost its birthright, that is used to living in the narrow circle of feuds and rivalries, will now proceed in an atmosphere of solemnity to cleans and purify the face of the nation as it appears in the various localities. In a veritable collective ecstasy, families which have always been traditional enemies decide to rub out old scores and to forgive and forget. There are numerous reconciliations. Long-buried but unforgettable hatreds are brought to light once more, so that they may be more surely rooted out. The taking on of nationhood involves a growth of awareness (ibid. 105)
Throwing aside the constraints of colonial society, he predicts the advent of a liberated upsurge in creative energy, promising unregulated innovation. Decolonisation will herald a more free-thinking and uninhibited community. Since colonial ideology manifests itself both practically, through social segregation, and linguistically in its propagation of skewed, stereotypical narratives, the attempt to challenge its tenets requires engagement with all sides. The colonised cannot simply question the details of the colonial vision, but must eliminate its entire discourse before installing a regime that is utterly new. What I find so important in Fanon’s call for violent decolonisation is both its uncompromising nature and its preoccupation with birthing the new, the creative, the becoming of humans. Again here I hope we can see the value of polemic—its refusal to negotiate and its intense desire for newness.
Finally, and far more briefly I want to turn to a statement on philosophy by Rafael Sebastián Guillén, now known as Subcomandante Marcos, a Mexican insurgent, former military leader and spokesman of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. In his undergraduate thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in 1980 he describes the necessity of leaving behind western philosophy in the following terms:
It is necessary to take some distance [from this philosophy]. Leave the discourse. Detect its mechanisms of operation, the places in which it emerges, the places where it has effect, the places where it disappears. It is necessary to speak of philosophy as non-philosophy, to turn philosophical discourse against itself…to change the problematics…to make a political change in theory…[recognize] various forms of ‘doing’ philosophy, various ‘practices’ of philosophy… open up problematics that might produce new theoretical and practical intentions…assume a political position that makes possible an ‘other’ discursive strategy, ‘other’ philosophical work, and opens ‘other’ spaces of theoretical production” (https://archive.org/details/FilosofiaYEducacioonPrarcticasDiscursivasIdeoloogicas/page/n3/mode/2up translated in Walsh 2012:11)
As Catherine Walsh notes in developing her own decolonial intervention that builds on Guillén’s manifesto, “other” knowledges…challenge not only the definitions and boundaries of philosophy, but also the geopolitical ordering of knowledge and the questions of who produces knowledge, how and where, and for what purposes” (2012:11). Specifically, she uses the work of Guillén to examine “the particular ways intellectuals and movements from the global south understand and use epistemic production as a key component of their political projects, projects aimed not simply at confronting the vestiges of colonialism (decolonialisation), but rather at the radical reconstruction of knowledge, power, being, and life itself” (ibid.). Through the work of Césaire, Fanon, and Guillén, we have well represented the themes I have tried in this paper to associate with the practice of polemic: repudiation, belligerence, refusal, the importance of thought connected to action, and the production of novelty. A decolonised philosophy which seeks a way out of and beyond “decoloniality” have to be understood as the simultaneous and continuous processes of transformation and creation, the construction of radically distinct social imaginaries, conditions, and relations of power, knowledge. The practice of polemic that each of these thinkers engage not only sets out why geophilosophy must be a necessarily fully decolonial praxis, they show us how to do it. They put the question of who and where the philosopher is at the heart of their ground-clearing work, born in struggle, seeking liberation. They declare war on the bankruptcy and lie of western philosophy and advocate the transformative potential of new thinking.
I started this piece with the idea of polemic as war. So I wanted to end by citing the little known polemicist Bob Marley’s song ‘War’. The lyrics are almost entirely derived from a speech made by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I before the United Nations General Assembly on 4 October 1963 and the song itself first appeared on Marley’s 1976 Island Records album, Rastaman Vibration:
Until the philosophy which hold one race superior / And another / Inferior / Is finally / And permanently / Discredited / And abandoned / -Everywhere is war – / Me say war.
That until there no longer / First class and second class citizens of any nation / Until the colour of a man’s skin / Is of no more significance / than the colour of his eyes / – Me say war.
That until the basic human rights / Are equally guaranteed to all, / Without regard to race / – Dis a war.
That until that day / The dream of lasting peace, / World citizenship / Rule of international morality / Will remain but a fleeting illusion to be pursued, / But never attained / – Now everywhere is war – / War.
And until the ignoble and unhappy regimes / that hold our brothers in Angola, / In Mozambique, / South Africa / Sub-human bondage / Have been toppled, / Utterly destroyed / – Well, everywhere is war – / Me say war.
Bibliography
Césaire, Aimé (1972) Discourse on Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Cixous, H. and C. Clément, The Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing, London: I.B. Tauris 1996: 72
Derrida, J. (1976) Of Grammatology. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Fanon, Frantz (1963). The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.
Fanon, Frantz (1967) Black Skin White Mask. New York: Grove Press.
Goldberg, D.T. (1990) ‘The Social Formation of Racist Discourse’, in D.T. Goldberg (ed.) Anatomy of Racism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mandair, A-p S. (2009) Religion and the Specter of the West: Sikhism, India, Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Translation. New York: Columbia University Press.
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