What stands between environmental ethics and the practice of geophilosophies? What does it take to bring the methodology into our research, into our classrooms? If we, as instructors, wish to practice geophilosophies, I think it first requires a deep reflection on the historical exclusion of non-Western thought from environmental ethics. Then, it requires reflection on what it means to open our discourse, classrooms, and syllabi to promote generative encounters between Western and non-Western thought, not in spite of their differences, but because of them (Mandair, 2022).
There is arguably no more foundational a concept in environmental ethics than the moral circle. It is a diagram for visualizing moral consideration, demonstrating an expanding historical process where humans learned to care about beings more and more dissimilar to themselves. This moral circle, however, is a fallacious oversimplification of selective history and so deeply entrenched in the systemic process of exclusion that it becomes wholly incommensurate with geophilosophies.
The concept of the moral circle was first introduced in 1869 by William Lecky to discuss how moral perspectives differed between historical time periods. It is an undeniably Western method of thought, coming from a text quite literally called “History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne.” It describes a selective human history, generalizing that “at one time the benevolent affections embrace merely the family, soon the circle expanding includes first a class, then a nation, then a coalition of nations, then all humanity, and finally […] the dealings of man with the animal world” (Lecky, 1869). The circle begins small, “I care only for myself,” and then expansion occurs to encapsulate family, friends, a nation, and so on. It was only ever meant to refer to time periods in European history, and yet the concept is now introduced in ethics classrooms as if it describes some universal truth of human existence.
This spurious generalization ignores the process of othering that has occurred in every one of those circles of expansion through the very same history Lecky portends to explain. There have been reasons for morally excluding a family member, a social peer, a foreigner, and animals throughout this same history where the circle is described as only expanding. For example, while homosexuality was common and morally acceptable in many Ancient Greek and Roman traditions, this group was later othered and morally excluded by the Catholic tradition (Human Rights Campaign, 2024).
At the same time, many philosophical and cosmological traditions never went through this process of ethical extension as they simply had no need for it. Indigenous philosophy, for instance, began with the assumption of communalism, interconnectedness, and implicit moral consideration within the environment; it did not need to evolve or expand.
The moral circle is also fundamentally hierarchical; the circle supports the ranking of interests from what is closest to farthest in the rings of considerability, starting from the individual. Lecky asserted that “the extinction of all selfish feeling is impossible for an individual, and if it were general, it would result in the dissolution of society. The question of morals must always be a question of proportion or of degree” (101). The inherently selfish moral circle then becomes incompatible with how many modern environmentalists use it to establish bioegalitarianism, the equal consideration of nonhuman life. The moral circle is inescapably egocentric, anthropocentric, and ethnocentric, supporting lesser consideration of interests for anyone or anything different from ourselves.
So what does this mean for the environmental ethics discipline? Are we to cut the moral circle from the syllabus and move on? What do we do with the authors who revitalized and built upon the moral circle in their own philosophies?
Aldo Leopold
Aldo Leopold, a prolific figure of environmental ethics, is one of these authors who built upon the moral circle, calling it ‘the ethical sequence’ (Leopold, 1949). Hwa Yol Jung calls him “incomparable” in Transversality & Geophilosophy in an Age of Global Philosophy (48). He is lauded as the man who “gave” the land inherent value. Ecocentrism, the ethics Leopold founded, is viewed as the last big expansion of the moral circle, extending moral consideration to the land itself.
However, if we are to reflect on the history of exclusion in the discipline, it should be remembered that the “incomparable” Aldo Leopold was a co-founder of Invasion Biology, a xenophobic characterization of non-native species rife with racism. He participated in the tradition of conservation that excluded any traditions of land stewardship that were not white and European. Furthermore, Leopold’s ideas were not novel. Aldo Leopold did not invent the concept of caring about land. It existed far before him in diverse traditions and practices around the globe. What Leopold did was package the land ethic into something palatable for Eurocentric philosophical traditions.
If Leopold’s ideas are to be viewed through a geophilosophies lens, they might easily be brought into conversation with indigenous ethics. Many environmental ethicists have previously made this connection, bringing the traditions together to suggest the possibility of a common ethical orientation for North America. Kyle Whyte, a philosopher, environmental justice professor, and citizen member of the Potawatomi nation, wrote in 2015 about the promise and pitfalls of the convergence and translation of the two ethics.
Whyte asserts that for the traditions to be brought together, it must be under the understanding that using Leopold as a translation device for non-Western ethics will exclude the very populations it meant to include in transversal discourse. Additionally, the apparent similarities cannot be confused as grounds for assuming that an indigenous person would agree with or follow Leopoldian ethics (Whyte, 2012).
Leopold’s ethics are founded on the ethical sequence, a process that never happened in Indigenous ethics because there was no need. Indigenous communities never othered themselves from the environment to begin with, holding communal moral considerations far before Western traditions. The tradition of excluding or otherwise othering cosmologies from non-Western and European traditions in the environmental ethics classroom perpetuates ignorance and xenophobia within the discipline. Engaging in a selective syllabus that only engages with Western traditions contributes to the fallacy of an incomparable tradition of ethical discovery and expansion.
Instructors can introduce non-Western concepts alongside and preceding Western alternatives to teach the very same concepts in environmental ethics. If Aldo Leopold’s “Thinking Like a Mountain” feels irreplaceable for its purpose in teaching students how to engage objectivity and temporal perspectives beyond immediate human interests, may I recommend recentering with the Sikh temporality of akal? From Sikh philosophy, “akal” refers to the idea of being beyond or free from the constraints of time. It suggests a reality that transcends temporal limitations and is not bound by past, present, or future (Mandair, 2022). This timelessness is an important aspect of understanding the divine nature in Sikhism and can be used to teach thinking beyond one’s lifespan and beyond linear time for environmental ethics.
If Leopold’s description of humanity as “plain citizens” of the environment feels irreplaceable for teaching bioegalitarianism and human participation in, rather than above, ecosystems, consider engaging with the Buddhist concept of inter-species being. Central to Buddhist philosophy, interspecies being recognizes that all forms of life are interconnected and interdependent, transcending distinctions between species (Wirth, 2023). It suggests that the well-being of one species is linked to the well-being of others, promoting compassion, empathy, and ethical responsibility towards all living beings. This understanding encourages humans to recognize their place within the broader biotic community while avoiding the problematic connotations of citizenship that Leopold employs.
If Leopold’s definition of the land as inclusive of both abiotic and biotic members feels necessary, consider indigenous philosophies like that of the Yellowknives Dene, who define the land as the “people and animals, rocks, and trees, lakes, and rivers, and so on” (Wirth, 2023). Leopold was not the first to describe an ecosystem as an interdependent community of both living and non-living members, nor the first to find moral obligations of stewardship for humans through this community. Indigenous ethics stem from a communal relation with the environment, a relationship of reciprocity, of gifts, that is not founded in human interests (Whyte, 2012).
Teaching the moral circle and authors that relied upon it to communicate their ethics to Eurocentric audiences is willfully ignoring the non-Western traditions that existed before the Western ones and can teach the same fundamental principles without carrying on legacies of exclusion in the discipline. Leopold is not exceptional and certainly not “incomparable,” and neither is the second author I bring to the table, Peter Singer.
Peter Singer
The moral circle, in its earliest conceptions, already extended to animals. So, why is Peter Singer’s book considered so influential? Once again, we are faced with a man who is popular, not because his ideas were revolutionary, but because he was able to make a difficult pill of moral considerability easier to swallow in the context of Eurocentric philosophical traditions. Animal rights, in their earliest conceptions, were indistinguishable from property rights. Initial animal welfare legislation, such as “Richard Martin’s Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle,” only prohibited abuse of animals belonging to someone else. Is this the expanded moral circle Lesky described for animals? It seems foreign to the intuitive moral consideration for animals in today’s society, having been exposed to ASPCA dog-adoption commercials with MacLachlan’s heart-wrenching ballad. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, published in 1975, utilized a pathos-driven strategy much like those tear-jerking commercials to mobilize a new form of utilitarianism that includes equal consideration of animal interests. He detailed the often horrific conditions in which animals are kept, especially in factory farms and laboratories, for human interests. Singer used the expanding moral circle concept, describing how moral concerns have historically broadened from family and tribe to encompass all humans and potentially even non-human animals, arguing for a conscious expansion of altruism. Under Singer’s animal interests ethic, all a species needs to be morally considered is the ability to suffer, biologically defined as having a central nervous system. Singer introduced the term “speciesism,” equating the privileging of your own species over another without relevant justification to racism and ableism. “Without relevant justification” is key here, as the utilitarian framework he constructs still allows for the prioritization of human interests in many situations – we are far from bioegalitarianism.
In the first step of moving towards geophilosophies, we must reflect on Singer’s history of exclusion. Peter Singer advocated for the right to kill disabled children. Not just abort fetuses, kill children. He has used the platform he has been given to argue that it is not morally wrong to rape severely disabled people or have sex with animals. If a being cannot understand consent, he claims they cannot withhold it. As a disabled woman, I find working and teaching within his philosophy difficult, knowing I am contributing to the platforming of a deeply problematic philosopher.
While it is not reasonable to remove from the syllabus every philosopher one morally disagrees with, I would again argue that there are other traditions that can be taught in place of Singer to achieve the same ends while also disrupting previous practices of exclusion in the discipline. Consideration of animal interests can be taught through interspecies being, but if you want to reserve that discussion for ecocentrism, many diverse traditions can replace Singer in discussing animal interests alone. North American indigenous traditions, specifically the Cree and Inuit tribes, hold that animals establish and enforce relational ground rules with humans and that there are reciprocal obligations (Persinger, 2020). Environmental ethicists can discuss duties to animals in more ways than just utilitarianism or reinterpretations of Kant’s inherent value.
Discussions of animal cruelty in the wake of commercialization can also occur without Singer. Robin Wall Kimmerer writes, “Something is broken when the food comes on a Styrofoam tray wrapped in slippery plastic, a carcass of a being whose only chance at life was a cramped cage. That is not a gift of life; it is a theft” (Kimmerer, 2015).
Many indigenous traditions include giving gratitude for an animal’s life, valuing them intrinsically as well as for the gifts their sacrifice provides in resources. There is great importance placed on using every part of the animal that has given its
life for humans; the distance of the consumer from the animal in modern systems precludes this practice. The discourse of considerations for animal interests does not need Singer; Indigenous traditions can be taught alongside and preceding Singer’s ethic, if he is to be taught at all. Further pioneers of animal and environmental ethics can also be considered, such as Val Plumwood, to bring ecofeminism into the discussion as well. Using trophic extensionism, the antithesis of the
extending moral circle, Plumwood engages in ecofeminist critique of the dualisms underpinning Western thought, advocating for the recognition of interconnectedness between humans and the natural world, challenging systems of domination and oppression (Plumwood, 2002). I could name dozens more, but I think I’ve made my point. The point of this provocation is not to define the perfect syllabus but to disrupt the willfull ignorance that environmental ethicists have employed by continuing to promote moral circle philosophers such as Leopold and Singer as exceptional.
Disrupting Willfull Ignorance
I am not asking environmental ethics professors to systematically remove every white man from the syllabus. I’m not advocating for the censorship of Western traditions in the environmental ethics classroom. What I am advocating for is the disruption of “willful hermeneutical ignorance,” to use Pohlhaus’ term, and to pluralize the traditions of philosophies taught. Peter Singer, Aldo Leopold, and many other big names of the environmental ethics classroom were not exceptional in their ideas, these ideas were already alive and thriving in other traditions, traditions which were being systematically oppressed while Leopold and Singer were venerated for making moral considerability easier to communicate and justify to their audiences. Environmental ethicists can engage in geophilosophies to communicate moral considerability without the moral circle and without the predominant philosophers who have used it. The current implicit linear, historical, and Western character of environmental ethics discourse is to its detriment. First, we reconcile with the long tradition of exclusion in the environmental ethics discipline, and then we can reflect on how to open our classrooms to non-Western thought and traditions and promote generative encounters. It is time to disrupt the willful ignorance of diverse environmental philosophies.
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